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THE RIGHT WAY TO REGULATE FROM BEHIND
BY FRANK PARTNOY*
Frank Partnoy argues that financial regulators inevitably will
"regulate from behind, " but could do better. Partnoy proposes that we
move to an ex post regulatory approach coupled with enforcement in
order to account for the extremely complex and rapidly changing
financial market. He advocates for open-ended standards, and greater
coordination between securities and financial regulators. Additionally,
Partnoy suggests that allowing voluntary disclosures, increasing
criminal prosecutions, and lessening the mental state needed for
conviction of financial crimes will lead to more effective regulation of
the financial marketplace. In conclusion, he argues that future financial
regulation would be more useful if subjected to a slower, more
thoughtful deliberation process.
In his remarks for this symposium, Judge Sporkin argued that
the Securities and Exchange Commission should no longer permit the
financial industry to "do anything they want, and only stop them when
they have gone so far as to bring about a financial crisis."' In other
words, the SEC should not "regulate from behind."
I want to offer a friendly amendment to Judge Sporkin's
remarks by focusing on two important regulatory distinctions and
trends. First is the crucially important distinction between ex ante
regulation (often based on rules) and ex post adjudication (often based
on standards). Second is the distinction based on the twin pillars of the
historical approach to securities regulation: between disclosure and
enforcement.
My argument is that both securities and other financial
regulators inevitably will "regulate from behind," but could do so better.
Regulators have fallen behind - and regulation has been ineffective, and
even counterproductive - in significant part because they have
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emphasized an ex ante approach and disclosure, instead of an ex post
approach and enforcement. Policy makers should reverse this course.
One of the primary reasons the SEC and other financial
regulators have favored an ex ante approach and disclosure is financial
innovation and complexity. The assumption is that market participants
need specific rules in order to conduct modem financial business and
further that the most important regulatory objectives can be achieved if
material information and risks are disclosed. However, because modem
financial instruments and strategies are so complex, market participants
have a significant informational advantage over regulators. Moreover,
to the extent rules apply to particular products, private parties use
regulatory arbitrage transactions to avoid rules. Disclosure requirements
alone will not lead parties to reveal material information, and
information alone is not sufficient to create adequate knowledge of risks
among regulators and investors. Given this complexity and behavior,
the SEC cannot keep pace and inevitably will fall behind.
I will not attempt to be comprehensive with respect to all or any
of these issues, but hopefully I can sketch out enough of an argument to
provide a useful roadmap for future thinking and research. In general,
market regulation has been moving from ex post adjudication to ex ante
rulemaking, with an emphasis on disclosure over enforcement. There
also has been a fracture between securities and other financial
regulation, with little useful coordination. The remedies are apparent:
legislators and regulators should embrace ex post adjudication and be
skeptical of the potential for ex ante rulemaking; likewise, they should
embrace enforcement as a key objective and become less sanguine
about disclosure as a cure-all. Finally, additional coordination is needed
between securities and other financial regulation, and various
government actors need to consider regulatory overlap and competition
more than they currently do.
First, one lesson from the recent wave of financial innovation is
that specifying securities disclosure rules in advance can be both
ineffectual and dangerous. As the system of securities disclosure has
become more complex, it has led to the generation of less useful
information. Jesse Eisinger and I recently attempted to demonstrate this
simultaneous complexity and lack of transparency as applied to
financial institutions in our Atlantic cover story, What's Inside
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America's Banks.2
We showed, as a preliminary matter, that trust in banks has
declined even as the amount of disclosure has increased. Ex ante
disclosure rules generate huge swaths of information, yet that
information does not include descriptions of the most important risks
and financial variables. The result is a lack of trust. According to
various surveys and polls, a substantial majority of both individual
investors and sophisticated institutional investors do not trust major
banks. Even five years after the crisis, bank financial statements and
footnotes remain opaque.
Eisinger and I sought to demonstrate this opacity by looking in
detail at one bank.4 Instead of taking on the relatively straightforward
task of critiquing JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, or Morgan Stanley-the
more "sophisticated" and complex financial institutions-we decided to
examine the apparently most conservative of the major financial
institutions, the one Warren Buffett owns eight percent of, the one
where I have a checking and savings account: Wells Fargo.5
Our journey was a Dante-esque decent into hell. We found,
among other things, that Wells Fargo has a huge derivatives portfolio
and earns substantial yet poorly described profits from trading activities
of various kinds. The bank makes huge profits from what it calls
"customer accommodation trades," which include, among other things,
trading based on "expected customer flow" (their words not ours).
Perhaps some of the offsetting derivatives trades that are part of
customer accommodation are hedges, but it is not possible to tell from
the bank's disclosures how much or to what extent. In any event, taking
on exposure based on expectations about customers is probably not a
conservative business.
Wells Fargo also reports substantial interests in Variable Interest
Entities (VIEs) representing over a trillion dollars of assets. VIEs are
the new versions of the Special Purpose Entities, step-cousins of the
vehicles that brought down Enron. In addition, Wells Fargo has $53
2. Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What's Inside America's Banks, THE ATLANTIC,
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billion worth of Level 3 assets, those assets that are valued based on
mathematical models and unobservable inputs. These instruments are
incompletely described, and their valuations are dubious. Overall, Wells
Fargo's derivatives portfolio reflects more than a trillion dollars of off-
balance sheet obligations.
Our examination of Wells Fargo illustrates how regulators have
embraced a predominantly ex ante disclosure-oriented approach. Bank
managers argue that their approach to risk and derivatives is fully
compliant with securities regulation because it satisfies specific
disclosure rules. But what if, instead of specifying in advance what
banks should disclose, the SEC simply said that banks should disclose
anything material and left it to the banks to figure out what to say?
Would bank disclosures be any more opaque under such a regime?
Might banks decide to disclose less information, but in a way that
investors would find more useful?
Banks might insist they need ex ante rules, but given the amount
of financial innovation, they will have incentives not only to influence
ex ante rules through lobbying, but also to comply in ways that satisfy
the letter of the rules and do not provide meaningful disclosure of
important risks. Instead, consider a disclosure regime that attempted to
harness the Holmesian definition of law as a prediction of what a judge
will do. Imagine that the SEC instructed bankers to describe in ten
pages of plain English what their risks are, including worst-case
scenarios. That information is what sophisticated investors want to
know in any event and, interestingly, some bank executives might
prefer to make these more limited disclosures instead of being bound by
the more onerous extant disclosure regime (though no one bank would
want to be a first mover; thus, regulatory "encouragement" would be
necessary).
The robustness of such disclosures would then be assessed after-
the-fact, either by regulators or judges as part of some kind of
adjudicatory process. Instead of regulators attempting to comb through
or comment on detailed disclosures in advance, an adjudicator would
assess them later. The beauty of this approach is that the fact that the
disclosures would be assessed later would be an information-forcing
mechanism to incentivize bankers to try to imagine subsequent
adjudication and then disclose the relevant facts that they believe would
pass muster after-the-fact. Given the pace of financial innovation, this
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approach is more likely to lead to meaningful disclosure because it can
internalize and reflect the preferences, expectations, and knowledge of
bankers, and it can do so in a less resource-intensive way than detailed
regulatory assessments in advance.
This after-the-fact proposal necessarily involves questions of
enforcement. As a logical matter, enforcement is primarily done ex post,
though to an increasingly common extent regulators are erecting ex ante
hurdles designed to achieve enforcement objectives. Licensing and
monitoring have not been particularly effective enforcement tools, even
as they have become more common, and it is difficult to predict ex ante
which individuals or institutions will become enforcement risks.
Moreover, regulators' attempts at early examination of reported
violations has not been effective: consider the SEC's inability to
respond to reports about pyramid schemes or wide-ranging frauds, or
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's failure to spot risks,
losses, and other problems at banks. Likewise, to the extent whistle-
blower regimes are likely to be effective, they will depend on how
disputes are adjudicated ex post, not whether regulators have been able
to specify the most suspicious areas in advance.
Perhaps the most important element of enforcement is criminal
responsibility. Although federal prosecutors have cited numerous
settlements during recent years, their enforcement priorities have been
directed primarily at insider trading and relatively straightforward
financial prosecutions. Critics continue to complain about the dearth of
complex or difficult prosecutions, and the lack of arrests of senior
officials for conduct at the core of the recent financial crisis. However
one might measure criminal cases related to the crisis, there are either
zero prosecutions of high-ranking bank officials or a very small number
of such prosecutions. Looking back, complex financial crisis cases
obviously were not a priority.
One concern with enforcement, and a reason prosecutors cite in
declining to bring cases, is the difficulty of establishing the required
criminal mental state beyond a reasonable doubt. One possible reform
related to this concern would be to require only proof of recklessness
for some financial crimes, instead of requiring proof of criminal intent.
For example, Congress might adopt a new "mini-fraud" statute, with a
lesser mens rea requirement and lesser jail time and/or fines. This
mental state requirement might be in line with recklessness, which is a
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required mental state for crimes in other substantive areas. The key
question in such cases is what a defendant "should have known," not
what the defendant actually knew.
Such a lesser mental state requirement might resurrect the
approach of United States v. Simon,6 in which a standard is established
in advance and then a wide umbrella of conduct is criminally proscribed
by that standard, even though the precise boundaries of what is
prohibited and what is not are not drawn in advance.7 Although some
financial market participants might object to such a broad standard-
based approach, it likely would pass constitutional scrutiny. Such a
lesser mens rea requirement might be applied to areas such as market
practice standards, fiduciary duties for broker-dealers, and some areas
of the Dodd-Frank legislation. Instead of a lengthy rule writing and
rulemaking process designed to specify what is illegal in advance, an
applicable statute or regulation could simply have one sentence that
essentially states that a specified category of conduct is illegal. Then,
judges or regulators would decide whether particular conduct fell within
the ambit of this category after the fact. Legislators or regulators might
provide some guidance in advance, perhaps with hypothetical cases, as
in the Restatement ofLaws.
Essentially, the idea is to explore returning, as much as possible,
to a regime of common law. There are numerous new areas of financial
market practice where this kind of approach might be preferable to
establishing detailed rules in advance. (This is particularly true if future
rulemaking will be subject to a detailed scrutiny of cost-benefit analysis,
including judicial assessment of that consideration based on Business
Roundtable.8 Ex post assessment might more easily pass, or at least
avoid, this kind of cost-benefit scrutiny.) For example, with the
proliferation of structured notes being sold to retail investors, the SEC
might consider new rules designed to require disclosure and impose
specific standards, such as suitability. But alternatively, the SEC might
simply shelve rulemaking in this area and instead bring a few
enforcement cases against the sellers of structured notes. Through the
6. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969).
7. Id.
8. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down the
proxy access rule giving certain shareholders access to the corporate proxy on the grounds
that the SEC's cost-benefit analysis fell short of the statutorily mandated standard).
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adjudication of these cases, regulators-and judges-might establish
new ex post standards to govern not only the conduct of the actors in
those cases, but other future actors as well.
Similar conclusions apply to financial regulation outside of the
securities area. Here, the ex ante regulatory approach is hugely
complicated and deeply broken. For example, the notion of net capital
requirements remains seriously flawed. The idea of banks tweaking
their risk-weighted asset models in response to new Basel requirements
is itself troubling. Consider the recent survey by the Basel committee,
which asked fifteen different institutions to examine a hypothetical
group of assets and determine a valuation for those assets. 9 The
valuation spread was a factor of eight. In other words, some bank
managers said the specified assets were worth eight times what other
managers said they were worth. Simply put, bankers game these kinds
of ex ante rules. Instead of identifying specific rules in advance,
financial regulators should adopt some sort of a common sense standard
that holds across the board for these uses of models internally. It would
hold for "value at risk" measures as well. In terms of financial
disclosure, gaming goes on with respect to risk-weighted assets, and the
idea is to get away from the ex ante specificity of rules and instead
move in the direction of ex post vagueness. Business people do not like
vagueness, but the regulation of complex finance requires a greater
degree of vagueness.
As one final example, consider the Volcker rule.10 Imagine if,
instead of trying to specify what constitutes "proprietary trading"
through an advance rulemaking, Congress instead had adopted a
different version of the Volcker rule as just one sentence: "Banks are
not permitted to engage in proprietary trading." Then, adjudicators
would decide later what that sentence means and whether particular
conduct fits within the rule's scope. One advantage to this common law-
style process is that it would minimize the influence of lobbying and
short-term politics. Instead, the development of the meaning of the rule
would take place slowly, over the course of years, as both market
9. FIN. STABILITY INST., FSI SURVEY: BASEL II, 2.5, AND III IMPLEMENTATION ( 2012),
available at http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiop2012.pdf.
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
The Volcker Rule is implemented by Title VI of the Dodd-Frank Act. The proposed version
of the rule is 300 pages long.
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participants and regulators came to define the details of what it means to
engage in "proprietary trading" as the borders of the rule evolved and
were tweaked over time.
A similar conclusion holds for worst-case scenario analysis.
Having banks articulate and understand worst-case scenario analysis is
an important part of disclosure. Investors want boards of directors to
grapple with questions about risk management, including what risks
could cause the institution to incur massive losses. Bank risk managers
could be required to engage in something like what the psychologist
Gary Klein has called a "pre-mortem," to try to isolate what factors
might lead to a bank's hypothetical collapse." (Some banks engage in
this sort of thinking, but many do not.) What if a bank's directors and
officers were required, once a year, to envision that their institution has
become insolvent, and ask the hard question about how that might have
happened? Then, they could describe those possibilities to the public, so
that investors would have a better sense of the bank's risk profile. If
boards needed assistance in understanding these risks, perhaps because
bank managers are overly optimistic or are reluctant to describe the
bank's downside potential, directors might elect to receive annual
presentations from those individuals and institutions that hold the
largest short positions in their stock. Short sellers might provide bank
boards with useful information they otherwise would not receive, and
then they could incorporate that information, with whatever degree of
skepticism is appropriate, into their "pre-mortem" assessments.
Ultimately, the optimal financial regulatory approach must
involve some degree of private action and ordering, particularly by the
boards of financial institutions. The question is not merely regulatory,
but is also one of corporate governance. A handful of courts have
recognized that boards are subject to heightened duties when making
decisions about and/or monitoring financial risks. These courts
understood a fundamental and crucial point: that financial risk is
different from other aspects of corporate governance. However, the
Delaware Chancery Court decision in the Citigroup derivative case
rejected that approach and instead held Citigroup's board to a lax
standard of liability for risk-related decisions and monitoring. 12 Future
I1. Gary Klein, Performing a Project Premortem, 85 HARV. Bus. REv. 18 (Sept.
2007), available at http://hbr.org/2007/09/performing-a-project-premortem/.
12. In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009)
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cases will give judges an opportunity to determine if the earlier cases
were the correct approach, or whether they should follow Citigroup. If
future courts recognize that financial risk presents a unique question for
boards, then the jurisprudence might evolve to hold that boards need to
be sufficiently aware of risks and have engaged in adequate risk
management activities in order to satisfy their Caremark monitoring
duties.' 3 Ideally, judges who understand financial risk will reject
Citigroup and adduce a board's monitoring of financial risk more
critically after the fact, thus returning to the Holmesian notion of what
law is.
Given that I have recently published a book called WAIT: The
Art and Science ofDelay, 14 1 cannot resist concluding by mentioning the
importance of timing with respect to all of these issues: we do not need
to reach any conclusions now, or even anytime soon. I hope what we all
will do in response to this symposium is take some time to wait, and
think. If you have been nodding and thinking that something I have said
is right, resist that. Or if you have been thinking what I've suggested is
entirely or in part foolish, resist that as well. Instead, take a month and
just think about all these issues. Decide later. Our decision making in
the financial context would be better if everyone-Congress, regulators,
bankers, and investors-took longer to consider the relevant issues, and
if we all avoided the crush of technology and the temptation to make
quick decisions and reactions.
(holding that the business judgment rule protects directors from liability).
13. Id.
14. FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY (2012).
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